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Abstract 
Elephant population numbers are seriously declining due to poaching activity to provide illegal ivory 
for crafted items, sculpture and jewellery. Despite seemingly robust legislation controlling legal ivory 
sales (including export permit requirements for UK sales abroad) and the that fact that synthetic 
ivory can now be created to the same diagnostic standards as genuine ivory, selling at a fraction of 
the cost, the demand for the ‘real thing’ continues to rise in craft and antique markets with very few 
prosecutions in the UK. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that “ghost ivory” (post 1947 worked 
ivory being sold as pre-1947 worked ivory) is being sold by traders to the unsuspecting and 
uneducated buyer. Two key illegal sub-markets are identified and a socio-legal and economic 
analysis of the regulatory options available is presented. 
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1. Introduction  
Ivory has been used as an artistic and cultural medium for millennia to create objects from the exotic 
and exquisite Chinese puzzle balls, Byzantine pyxis and Japanese Netsuke to household items such as 
knife handles, piano keys and billiards balls but ivory has a dark history and the killing of elephants 
for their ivory is not a modern day phenomenon. The Greeks and Romans had hunted the North 
African elephant to extinction more than two millennia ago with their use of the animals for warfare, 
ornament and as exotic entertainment to be slain by gladiators in the Roman arenas ( Alchin, L., 
2015) (also see Walker, 2009). The Chinese elephant had met the same fate by 600BC (Ji Li et al, 
2012) and so it is not without due cause that modern day conservationists fear for the fate of the 
wild elephant population with recently reported figures from WWF stating that wild elephant 
numbers have declined from 1.3 million in 1979 to 600,000 in 1989 to an estimated 400,000 today 
(www.panda.org, 2015).  
Ivory substantially features in the wildlife monitoring network TRAFFIC’s estimate of the illegal trade 
in wildlife products. This trade is considered to be worth around one-third of the legal trade of $22.8 
billion, which would equate to a value of between $7.6 and $8.3 billion a year (TRAFFIC, 2015). The 
largest consumers of the illegal trade being China, the US and EU and the most lucrative specimens 
being traded are elephant ivory, rhino horn and tiger bones as well as birds and reptiles (Lawson & 
Vines, 2014) (also see National Crime Agency, 2014).  
The conservationists’ warnings of wildlife population decreases to the point of near extinction has 
led to 181 countries ratifying the Convention on the Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). Hailed as 
“the Magna Carta for Wildlife” (Layne 2012), CITES subject wildlife imports to mandatory licensing 
and incorporates a banned list of prohibited species set out in its Appendix I and a “controlled list” 
list of species (Appendix II). The Convention was established to be implemented through Member 
Countries’ national laws with each Member Country being tasked with reporting data back to a 
biennial CITES conference. 
The UK, a founder member of the Convention, first legislated to give effect to CITES with the 
enactment of The Endangered Species (Import & Export) Act 1976. This initial statute has been 
substantially amended and is now largely superseded by European Regulations. The Control of Trade 
in Endangered Species (Enforcement) Regulations 1997 (COTES) make provision for enforcement of 
the European Regulations and this is an evolving instrument and frames the legal regulations with 
which UK sellers of ivory must comply (Council Regulation EC No. 338/97 art 4.1 and 4.2). While 
COTES regulates trade offences once the species has entered the UK, the Customs and Excise 
Management Act 1979 ("CEMA") covers the illegal import and export of CITES species (Magistrates’ 
Court Sentencing Guidelines, 2002). The current regulations state that for ivory to be legally 
exported or imported from or into the EU, an export and import permit is required from the 
designated (CITES) Management authorities of the export and import countries.  These permits act 
as proof that the ivory was legally acquired and that the trade should not be detrimental to the 
survival of the species (CEMA, 1979).  
This study serves to assess the regulatory context and options available to curb the activity in illegal 
ivory markets ranging from permissive to more prohibitive options. The paper is organized in the 
following manner.  The next section considers the role and legal status of ivory within the antique 
trade.  In section 3 some UK cases are then briefly examined to illustrate the limited efficacy of the 
current legal position in the UK in bringing about a substantial number of prosecutions for illegal 
ivory trading. The following section helps account for this limited success by establishing the range 
and complexity of the illegal sub-markets in ivory. Section 5 evaluates the range and applicability of 
various regulatory policy instruments ultimately seeking to help secure elephant populations in the 
face of an escalating recent onslaught of poaching activity. The final section offers summary and 
concluding remarks. 
2. Ivory and the Antiques Trade 
Within the EU, ivory can only be legally sold under certain conditions. It is generally forbidden to use 
Annex A-listed ivory for commercial purposes (Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97). However, sale of 
Annex A listed ivory is permitted if the intended use is non-commercial in nature and in addition to 
this exemption there is an antiques derogation that means “worked”  ivory specimens acquired 
before 1 June 1947 do not require a certificate. The regulations state that specimens will be 
considered as worked if they are significantly altered from their raw state for jewellery, adornment, 
art, utility, or musical instruments, and need no further carving, crafting or manufacture to effect 
their purpose. In addition to this, as of the 9th May 2013 to claim the derogation the item must also 
be worked across the whole surface. As an example, an antique  carved netsuke of Shishi, the 
Chinese guardian lion created from a piece of tusk to depict Shishi in great detail will be able to claim 
the derogation, whereas a 19th century Anglo-Indian ivory dinner gong, like the one sold by 
Morphets Auction House in  Harrogate, in November 2011 would no longer fall within the 
derogation. 
Most antiques, enjoy this “worked item” derogation exemption from the CITES regulations, 
however, dealers and auctioneers need to be very clear about the law when they take in for sale or 
sell an ivory item as the timing of the working is vital. The CITES guidance (European Union Wildlife 
Trade Regulations, 2015) gives the following example: an ivory billiards ball made in 1900. As it was 
significantly altered from its original state (a raw tusk) to make the ball many years before the cut-
off date of June 1947, it can therefore be legally sold within the EU without the need for a CITES 
certificate. The billiards ball would still come within the derogation if it had been re-carved, for 
example to make a walking stick handle, before June 1947. However, if the re-carving had been done 
after that date, it would be outside the derogation and need a CITES certificate from the department 
of Animal Health's Wildlife Licensing and Registration Service (Antique Trade Gazette, 2013).  In May 
2013, significant changes were introduced following new guidance from the European Commission 
on the interpretation of the "worked item" derogation and since then the "worked item" derogation 
does not apply to the import or export of items outside the EU. Anything sent by a UK antiques 
dealer to a buyer outside the EU will require an export permit (CEMA, 1979). Dealers have reported 
their confusion at the regulations as to the “worked item” derogation and leading UK solicitor, 
Andrew Banks of law firm Stone King who advises members of the antiques trade on CITES 
requirements has criticised DEFRA on its “wholesale failure” to make the trade properly aware of 
changes to the CITES regulations (Arkell, 2015).  
In addition to COTES, ancillary legislation exists in the UK which, while not directly relevant to the 
illegal wildlife trade, is linked to it. The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Serious Crime Act 2015 
address offences which have been shown to facilitate the illegal wildlife trade, such as money-
laundering. 
Despite the seemingly robust legislation and regulations controlling the sale of ivory and the fact 
that synthetic ivory can now be created to the same diagnostic standards as genuine ivory (Sims et 
al, 2011) and selling at a fraction of the cost, the demand for the “real thing” continues to rise. 
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that sellers are using this to their advantage by passing off 
real (illegal) ivory as synthetic and indeed vice versa when they come to sell it (Sims et al, 2011).   
As a consequence of these various rules, constraints and uncertainties the attainable sale prices for 
ivory objects have become unstable. In particular, the U.S. federal ban introduced in February 2014 
has had an unsurprising detrimental impact on the prices of, in particular, high end ivory artefacts. 
The inability of dealers to take items to the U.S. to sell has unquestionably resulted in a drop in 
prices and a decline in the economies of specialist dealers (Macquisten, 2015). In addition to this, 
there can be little doubt that the fear of a total ban on the sale of ivory is also taking its toll on the 
legal trade in antique ivory items (Macquisten, 2015). Buyers are also understandably nervous about 
purchasing an object which may become illegal to re-sale. The current U.K. regulations have been 
accused of being anything but clear (Arkell, 2015) and this is perhaps best illustrated by the recent 
case against international auction house Christies. On the 23 May 2016, Christies were fined £3,250 
for offering for sale an “unworked” ivory object, an un-carved tusk mounted on silver dating to 1880. 
The item was due to be offered at Christie’s South Kensington sale on April 28, 2015 but following a 
tip-off to the Wildlife Crime Unit of the Metropolitan Police, the item was seized (Actman, 2016). In 
court, Christies’ representatives apologised for what they called an “isolated incident”. Contrary to 
some national press reports, this was not an issue of CITES licenses. The guidelines for the sale of 
“worked” items was revised by the CITES management authorities in December 2012, making an 
item such as the one offered for sale by Christies no longer subject to the ‘worked item’ derogation. 
The fact that the changes to the regulations were poorly advertised carried no weight with the court 
stating that, “Christie’s professionals should know what they are doing and should be beyond 
reproach" (Capon, 2016). 
3. UK Cases 
It is an interesting fact that despite the calls for the sale of antique ivory to be outlawed, there have 
been only seventeen successful prosecutions1 against members of the antiques trade for the sale of 
illegal ivory under Regulation 8 COTES in the last twenty four years (TRAFFIC, 2015). However, this 
may not give a full picture of COTES offences particularly if viewed in light of the Elephant Trade 
Information System (ETIS) data. These figures show the UK to be playing an increasing role in the 
illegal ivory trade both at import and re-export but also as a transit country with reported seizures 
by the U.K. to ETIS between 2010 and 2014 to be 154 (averaging 30.8 seizures per year) with total 
seizures in the preceding five years being only seventy five (amounting to an average of 15 seizures 
per year).2  
The antiques trade in the UK is disparate and diverse and includes the leviathans of the auction 
world such as Christie’s, Bonham’s and Southeby’s, through high end dealers specialising in specific 
artefacts to general auction houses and dealers with a non-specific stock (of which ivory may be a 
part) to finally, the opposite end of the trade, ‘car booters’ and house clearance companies, with 
generally little knowledge of what they are selling. Educating and regulating this diverse population 
is challenging and whilst trade associations do exists, the fast majority of the trade do not belong to 
one. 
COTES offences are notifiable to the Home Office however, statistical analysis of those offences 
under CITES is not possible as CITES offences have not been allocated a specific code and are, 
therefore, recorded under the general Home Office code "999/99 Other crime or record only entry 
not catered for elsewhere" (Environmental Audit Committee, 2012). In addition, as CITES offences 
                                                          
1 See Appendix 1 
2 ETIS, managed by TRAFFIC, tracks illegal trade in ivory and other elephant products 
(https://cites.org/eng/prog/etis/index.php) 
are tried either in the Magistrates Court or the Crown Court (i.e. lower courts) they are not formally 
‘reported’ and so do not appear on legal databases.  
However, against this backdrop there have been two high profile cases involving the prosecution of 
an auctioneer and a dealer both of which occurred in October 2014. 
The first case to come to court was that of R v Chiswick Auctions (William Rouse) [14 October 2014, 
Ealing Magistrates Court] which saw Chiswick Auctions fined £3,200 for the sale of a  tusk carved to 
represent a train of elephants that came from an elephant killed during the 1960s. The successful 
prosecution followed an investigation by the Wildlife Crime Unit and Arts and Antiques unit officers 
during an on-going operation against modern ivory sales in London. Officers had discovered and 
seized the object from a Portobello Road Market dealer and their investigations tracked the item 
back to Chiswick Auctions. The prosecution, following the seizure of the item sent it for forensic 
testing which showed that the elephant had died after the 1947 cut-off date. The auction house’s 
records showed that it had gone under the hammer for £100. Although, the auction house pleaded 
guilty to the offence on October 14th 2014, stating that a senior auctioneer had made a mistake in 
the age of the item, Chiswick Auction’s Managing Director,  William Rouse spoke after the verdict of 
his shock at the size of the penalty “for an isolated incident that earned the auctioneers 
commissions of around £40” and that he believed the auction house had been “harshly treated in 
response to a cause célèbre” finally stating that "a huge amount of public money has been spent on 
this matter but to what end? We are still permitted to sell antique ivory and what has it taught us 
apart from the need to be even more vigilant in a situation where every auction room in the land 
treads a difficult line?" (Arkell 2014).  While Mr Rouse’s attitude may not be shared by all of his 
fellow antiques professionals, dealers are quick to point out that while they find illegal elephant 
poaching abhorrent, they also consider the legislative rules and regulations confusing and difficult to 
follow. 
The second case (R v Sara Wilkinson [20 October 2014 Isleworth Crown Court] involved a dealer, 
Sally Wilkinson of Chanticleer Antiques, who was charged with the sale of an ivory carving of a nude 
figure that police believed had been worked after June 1947. In contrast to the Chiswick Auctions 
case, here the prosecution did not send the item for forensic testing to date it definitively, rather 
they proceeded on the basis that it was up to the defendant to prove it was carved before 1947. Ms 
Wilkinson, an experienced ivory dealer of more than 45 years, pleaded not guilty to the offence 
remaining firm in her assertion that the carving dated to the 1870s. Following her “Not Guilty” plea, 
the case was sent from Hammersmith Magistrate's Court to Isleworth Crown Court where the judge 
described placing the burden of proof on the defendant as "a bridge too far" (ATG Reporter, 2014). 
The prosecution, however, had already by then decided to withdraw the case. 
Two issues that require addressing come out of these two cases. Firstly, there is clearly a need for a 
process to be in place to ascertain the age of ivory accurately and cheaply. The forensic testing 
undertaken by the prosecution in Chiswick case will have costs in the region of £450 + Value Added 
Tax (VAT), (Oxford Radiocarbon Accelerator Unit, 2015) against an item that had gone under the 
hammer for £100, making the auction house £40 in commissions. Secondly, the stance of the police 
in the Wilkinson case raises concerns about where the burden of proof should lie in such cases. The 
presumption of innocence is a corner stone of English law and the prosecuting authorities attempt 
to reverse this should concern the antiques trade.  
The police and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) have stated that in their view, future prosecutions 
should be brought on the basis that it is for the Defence to prove the age of the artefact in question 
– in other words, that a Regulation 8 offence should be prosecuted on a strict liability basis. In a CPS 
Memorandum of Understanding prepared following the collapse of the Wilkinson case, it concludes 
that “notwithstanding situations where a specimen’s identity is obvious, the law provides that if a 
specimen is advertised, displayed or otherwise packaged as being/containing a controlled specimen, 
it shall be taken as such and the Crown is under no obligation, legal or otherwise, to prove its 
nature.”   This stance should be of concern to the antiques trade as it is a major departure from the 
current prosecution guidelines taking, as it does, the mens rea (or the intention or knowledge of 
committing the offence) out of the crime. 
What is certain is the fact that currently little is known about the extent of trading in illegal ivory in 
the UK (IFAW, 2004). Despite the set of legislation at the law enforcers’ hands, convictions seem to 
be few. This may be due to a variety of factors, including inter alia, a lack of resources available to 
the police and Border Force, a “soft” attitude by the judiciary or a lack of specialist knowledge. 
Alternatively it may be that the scale of the problem is already known but not easily identified. 
4. Disentangling the Illegal Market for Ivory 
The legal and trade context outlined above highlights the active functioning of a number of different 
illegal sub-markets for ivory and in which different  mixes of regulatory policy instruments are likely 
to be appropriate. For the design of policy prescriptions and choice of regulatory instruments along 
the global supply chain then these illegal sub-markets may potentially be combined into two broad 
categories: 
Category 1:  Newly poached ivory – to make new craft items (openly to criminally complicit 
consumers or passed off as synthetic when suppliers and consumer know this is not so, or passed off 
as “ox bone” craft items (as may be found on eBay), (IFAW, 2004) or treated to make it appear old 
(pre-1947) with a view to making a sale on the legitimate antique market.) 
Category 2: Post 1947 existing ivory craft items or ivory for crafting (passed off as pre-1947 or as ox 
bone) 
 
 
 
Newly poached ivory 
For category 1, while CITES remains in place all international trade is illegal on conservation grounds. 
Thus the only testing required is to identify whether a tusk has been treated to appear to be pre-
1947 tusk. Such tests do exist and expert visual assessment can also be deployed to identify such 
artificial ageing (UNDOC, 2014).  
From a legal, economic and ecological perspective it is a legitimate question to consider whether 
lifting the CITES international ban would stoke demand for new ivory or would it actually serve to 
reduce the incentive to poach by depressing market price, given a greater supply of ivory would 
legitimately come onto the market. Some consideration of this question is warranted, particularly as 
the status quo is characterised by a huge increase in poaching incidents and with wilderness areas, 
national parks, game reserves and conservation agencies in the main elephant hosting countries 
having very little revenue to protect herds beyond domestic sales3 from natural mortality and active 
conservation management. If demand is stoked substantially then trading will accelerate the path 
towards species extinction and even earlier sub-species extinctions. If the market price is depressed 
it may still only reduce the poaching effort expended for a relatively short time period. This is 
because in the longer run stocks of ivory will deplete given long reproduction cycles within elephant 
herds. Thus the replenishment rate to stocks may well be insufficient to meet even stable demand. 
Extinction of course may be a considered a desirable objective by those with large stocks of elephant 
ivory (Mason, Bulte, and Horan, 2012). 
Making matters worse, however, we know that any price reduction effect is strongly subject to the 
usual ceteris paribus condition of stable demand. Unfortunately, we know that consumers strongly 
value authentic ivory over substitutes, such that demand is probably highly inelastic. Further there 
                                                          
3 One might also observe that domestic sales in most countries where there are substantial elephant herds 
(e.g. Central and Southern Africa) are not likely to be supporting ‘immediate domestic use’, but rather are 
either held as speculative assets contingent on future CITES international trade ban lifting, or are held with a 
few to effecting illegal international smuggling (contravening CITES) in the near future to exploit high ivory 
prices in markets in East Asia and elsewhere. 
are rising real incomes and populations in China, Thailand and Laos such that market demand is 
growing (shifting rightwards) and that this growth is likely to be persistent. This means that lifting 
the CITES trade ban may not even lead to a significant price dip and could even coincide with price 
rises. Accordingly one cannot in any way confidently expect that on its own the simple act of lifting 
the CITES ban will automatically lead to lower poaching effort being expended and less elephants 
being slaughtered. Such simplistic thinking has been characterised by Ostrom, Janssen and Anderies 
(2007) and Ostrom and Cox (2010) as a “panacea problem”. By this is meant “…a tendency, when 
confronted with pervasive uncertainty, to believe that scholars can generate simple models of linked 
social–ecological systems and deduce general solutions to the overuse of resources.” [p1. Ostrom et 
al 2007]. One such ‘simple’ solution advanced has been to just permit legalized trading of ivory. 
Past studies in the economic analysis and regulation of endangered species product markets have 
long entertained the possibility of some limited legalized trading in ivory to (i) provide some 
incentives for the sustainable management of elephants and (ii) on the demand-side to provide ivory 
users some access to limited supplies in order to reduce the incentive to push further underground a 
trade with smuggling and black market aspects (Barbier et al 1990, Bergstrom 1990). To combat such 
black market activity underpinned by wildlife poaching Kremer and Morcom (2000) advanced a 
solution predicated on the accumulation of a public stockpile of storable wildlife commodities. This 
would then enable the relevant government to threaten to dump them on the market if the extant 
population of the poached wildlife fell below a certain level. Essentially this might be labelled a time-
consistent stockpiling policy. A similar line of thinking was also articulated in the specific context of 
the conservation of black rhino (Brown and Layton (2001). Focussing more generally across all 
endangered species goods Fischer (2004) set out a simple model to explore whether limited 
legalized trade in otherwise illegal goods can be helpful for achieving policy goals like reducing 
poaching. Institutional and biological considerations were not really accorded any scrutiny in that 
economic analysis. 
For both ivory and rhino horn the key policy actors did, however, enact and sustain an outright ban 
via an ‘Appendix 1’ listing in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Flora and Fauna (CITES) in 1973 and 1989. Stiles (2004) recorded how this led to unsustainably large 
elephant herd sizes in some Southern African countries alongside an inability to use the proceeds 
from ivory sales and sales of other by-products to directly finance conservation efforts. Hence, these 
countries continued to argue for the ban to be lifted. The possibility of this large herd size result for 
elephants was the subject of some earlier formal economic conjecture (Bulte and van Kooten 1996) 
but nevertheless, wildlife poaching of both elephants and rhinoceros has continued apace with black 
rhino pushed to ‘critically endangered’ status and white rhinos deemed to now be ‘conservation 
dependent’. Stockpiles of ivory and rhino horn have, however, been accumulated across various 
Southern African countries and there is now much popular press and academic discourse calling for 
the lifting of trade bans in the face of continuing high levels of poaching (Scanlon, 2014). This 
pressure continued to build in the run up to the September 2016 CITES Conference of the Parties 
meeting which took place in Johannesburg, South Africa. In terms of the ivory trade, the meeting 
culminated in the conference adopting a non-binding resolution to close domestic ivory markets that 
contribute to poaching and the illegal ivory trade. The resolution sets out that it “recommends that 
all Parties and non-Parties in whose jurisdiction there is a legal domestic market for ivory that is 
contributing to poaching or illegal trade, take all necessary legislative, regulatory and enforcement 
measures to close their domestic markets for commercial trade in raw and worked ivory as a matter 
of urgency”(CITES, 2016). Although the resolution was unilaterally passed ay all 182 CITES members, 
there are fears amongst some conservation groups that the wording of the resolution enables 
countries that argue that their ivory markets do not contribute to poaching or the illegal trade to 
ignore it in practice. Time will tell and Japan immediately responded by stating that the resolution 
was not applicable to them for this reason. However the Chinese response has been more positive 
with the country stating by an official Press Announcement on the 30th December 2016 that it will 
close its domestic ivory market (with the exemption of antique ivory) by the end of 2017. What 
remains of concern to conservationists is the position of Hong Kong in the illegal ivory trade chains 
remains the same. Here there have been no announcements as to accelerating the closure of the 
domestic market. Cheryl Lo, a senior wildlife crime officer with WWF explained the groups concerns 
saying that “With China’s market closed, Hong Kong can become a preferred market for traffickers 
to launder illegal ivory under cover of the legal ivory trade” (The Guardian, 2016). 
Notwithstanding the 2016 CITES meeting and in the aftermath of a huge increase in elephant and 
rhino poaching incidents in Central and Southern Africa in recent years, increasingly the emphasis of 
work on policy options has been on a need to change tack and try different policy solutions. This is 
the current context given that maintaining the business-as-usual regulatory and policy context does 
not seem able to adequately obstruct the path towards sub-species and eventually species 
extinction. More recently Biggs et al (2013) argued for the necessity of such a radical proposal in 
tandem with some measure of regulatory activity harnessing existing technology able to discern the 
provenance of the rhino horns. The intention is to help obstruct ‘laundering’ of illegal ivory/rhino 
horn and the practice of illegal trading. Arguably this and other work is overly confident on the scope 
for relying on technology in isolation to resolve the poaching problem and neglects consideration of 
the basic organizational architecture and market institutions that would need to evolve to support 
sustainable trading. These and some other points were set out in a short response to that work 
(Collins, Fraser and Snowball 2013) and subsequently expanded in Collins, Fraser and Snowball 
(2015). 
That work seems to raise many awkward questions for regulatory design rather than provide 
comprehensive answers supported by clear direct evidence. Furthermore, the setting of that work 
has already been somewhat overtaken by events. Following a court judgement in late November 
2015 (BBC News 2015), South Africa has now lifted the ban on the domestic trading of rhino horn in 
South Africa overturning a moratorium on the trade imposed by the South African Government in 
2009. This decision has potentially strong repercussions for ivory trading elsewhere in Central and 
Southern Africa. This legal judgement was founded on two reasons, namely, lack of public 
consultation before the ban was invoked and a failure to stem the poaching crisis with the ban in 
operation. 
The reasoning for the judgement is open to question given that public consultation is clearly not 
always clearly present in all other examples of such public decision-making in South Africa. 
Furthermore, the implied legal explanation for the poaching crisis (i.e. lack of public consultation and 
high levels of poaching in the post-ban period) seems overly simplistic set against the more nuanced 
and multidimensional reasoning offered in Collins, Fraser and Snowball (2016). 
Post 1947 existing ivory craft items or ivory for crafting 
For category 2 ivory there are discernible attempts to pass off as pre-1947 ivory and also to pass of 
via e-bay and other distribution channels as ‘ox bone’. The term ‘ox bone’ has become a generally 
understood code for ivory to bypass trading sanctions. Consumers of ox bone items would likely be 
very dissatisfied if they actually received ox bone and would likely not rate the supplier highly on 
eBay. This would impact on their trading reputation and business longevity. Perry (2014) notes that 
eBay ‘banned’ all ivory sales after an investigation by the International Fund for Animal Welfare 
exposed how 2,275 elephant ivory items were sold in a single week in 2007. However, sellers bypass 
the ban by using the label of ox bone or other terms.  If ox bone trading was banned then another 
term or label would doubtless emerge to skirt round any eBay regulations. Further, even if all 
antique trading was banned on eBay other trading sites would inevitably emerge to meet the 
demand for such a trading market to operate (IFAW, 2014). 
5. Regulatory Context and Regulatory Instruments 
In considering how to address illegal ivory trading there are a number of regulatory options but the 
ambit and scope of their applicability is predicated on the relevant institutional, jurisdictional, 
ecological and geographical context as well as a number of mundane practical concerns.  
Investigations of eBay for category 2 illegal ivory trading can be done by trade inspectors and police 
using agent provocateur and ‘sting’ tactics but this would need to be done continuously or with 
major resource-intensive large scale operations to have a discernible impact.  Actually selling ox 
bone would reveal some buyers identities who might be frightened into refraining from subsequent 
illegal purchases via warning letters. Hitherto, no such attempts have been made via this warning 
letter approach, thought it has been tried in the context of music and film internet piracy with 
relatively little success (Green 2014). 
In terms of category 1 illegal ivory sales we know that after the 1989 CITES international trade ban 
that the overall population of elephants in the African continent substantially increased. Despite this 
outcome, analysis of elephant population data over the period 1979-2007 shows that within some 
37 African countries elephant numbers were still being lost. Lemieux and Clark (2009) suggest that 
this is largely explained by the degree of regulatory efficacy. Within these 37 countries there was 
deemed to be present (despite CITES) what effectively comprise unfettered and unregulated ivory 
markets. Their presence eases the conduct of both illegal domestic and international trading.  As 
such in accordance with the standard Becker supply of crime model (Becker 1968) merely 
announcing the imposition of a full trade ban will not guarantee full compliance.  To support such a 
ban there must also be strong enforcement resources visibly present, else a low probability of arrest 
and conviction is signalled and factored into criminal decision-making. In turn this leads to a higher 
expected rate of return from poaching and thus more poaching effort expended. 
It is straightforward to advance plausible reasons for why regulatory laxity in this specific 
environmental context may be found. First, all of these 37 countries are ‘less developed countries’ 
with low GDP per capita, high infant mortality, low school enrolment and in many cases nutrition 
and food security issues. Against such a macroeconomic backdrop, public spending for wildlife 
protection may not be given the priority it deserves, particularly when looking from a more global 
environmental resource conservation perspective. Accordingly, international cooperation and 
resource transfers are necessary (though not sufficient) to reduce poaching and reverse elephant 
population decline in the short to medium term. Secondly, institutional quality matters. Many of 
these countries feature what Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) would describe as weak or eroded 
institutional quality typified by democratic deficiencies, high levels of political, public and corporate 
corruption, weak oversight of public expenditure disbursement, a small and diminishing tax base and 
low trust in police and judicial processes.  
In this context illegal trading is more readily able to be sustained. Institutional quality also has a 
direct bearing on the willingness to monitor elephant killings and to help track illegal trading as 
mandated by CITES (CITES: 3rd March 1973). This provides baseline information and local statistical 
data to inform any targeted regulatory enforcement. 
These general regulatory imperatives condition the geographical applicability of any specific 
regulatory policy instrument. For example, as Bennet (2015) discusses in the context of the potential 
establishment in some circumstances of controlled legal trading in ivory, robustly credible and 
transparent systems (to obstruct potential governmental corruption) would need to first be set in 
place. Only then might it be possible to firmly guarantee that ivory from illegally killed elephants 
could not be laundered on any legal market.  
One of the circumstances under which controlled legal ivory trading might be permitted is in the 
context of allowing episodic or ‘one off’ trades of illegal ivory seizures or ivory from natural mortality 
and active conservation management. The rationale here is that such trades might help provide 
revenue to finance conservation effort (Scanlon, 2014). Again robust and transparent systems would 
need to already be in place to detect attempts at laundering ivory sourced beyond seizures, natural 
mortality and conservation management. Similarly transparency is needed to ensure that the 
resultant revenues are manifestly directed to supporting conservation efforts and not enriching 
participants in corruption. 
Advocates of such episodic or one off sales have not remained unchallenged. In large part this 
relates to understandable conservationist antipathy to effectively buttressing the supply chain 
serving previously (and potentially contemporaneously) illegal consumers. Elements of this supply 
chain comprise people with links to, or actual members of, criminal syndicates and rebel militias 
(engaged in many other criminal markets and enterprise). As such for some conservationists it is 
highly distasteful and potentially dangerous to tacitly or explicitly work with them, as it proffers 
some measure of respectability on such individuals. It should be noted that fighters of the ‘Lord's 
Resistance Army’ (LRA) were identified and formally sanctioned by the United Nations Security 
Council in 2014 for illegal hunting and ivory trading, especially in central Africa. 
More fundamental policy and operational objections to such trades relate to their possible 
undesirable economic effects, which have prompted some countries to publicly burn or crush 
seizure stockpiles (see Zane 2016) in the full glare of media scrutiny. Scriber (2014) contends that 
these undesirable economic effects arise from confusion about the prospect of more one off legal 
ivory trades. He argues that this has helped to boost speculative poaching motives, thus sustaining 
relatively high black market prices and encouraging high levels of actual poaching effort. Suggesting 
such a direction of causality is an entirely legitimate and logically plausible assertion. Ideally this 
would be subjected to independent empirical scrutiny but inevitably such a task is hindered by black 
market prices series not being readily available. It also remains plausible that game farm and hunting 
lobbyists as well as government corruption might also try to raise the frequency of such one off 
trades such that they occur even when they are not biologically warranted. Such charges have also 
been levelled against Zimbabwe in the context of legal (under CITES) stock export sales justified on 
the basis of guarding against elephant overpopulation, even when population estimates have been 
strongly disputed (Teagle 2015).  
With the CITES status quo in place for both category 1 and 2 illegal sub-markets and assuming 
willingness for reasonable international cooperation and strong institutional quality in place, a mix of 
more narrowly focussed regulatory policy instruments can be actively considered at various points of 
intervention along the illegal supply chain.  Applied singularly they are unlikely to prove effective in 
arresting the decline of elephant numbers and avoiding species extinction. Some of these policy 
instruments are considered below. 
Improved cross country intelligence gathering on the criminal gangs is clearly vital but in terms of 
addressing on-the-ground poaching one immediate measure that is being undertaken in some 
country contexts such as Kenya is to raise deterrence levels far higher. This has been done by 
effectively legitimising a shoot-to-kill policy when engaging poachers.  This seems draconian but in 
truth many poachers are better armed and equipped than rangers so that ambush surprise tactics do 
help rebalance the rules of engagement. Unfortunately this policy does not usually involve the 
criminal kingpin responsible but can make their operations more costly. Yet kingpins are often 
protected by front men and a lack of extradition agreements between some countries. Collins, 
Fraser, Snowball 2016 note work that points out that there is no shortage of low income and 
unemployed men willing to joining wildlife poaching trips, so that anti-poaching patrols and rangers 
must be well resourced and active throughout the current onslaught of poaching and beyond to 
ensure continuing deterrence. The problem is compounded by truly remote wild herds in central 
Africa being significant to species survival as well as herds in national parks and private reserves 
which are somewhat easier assets to protect. 
At the level of consumers, education to adults and children about the need for sustaining wildlife 
and biodiversity is a laudable measure but sadly likely to be very slow to realise sufficiently rapid 
returns in terms of arresting elephant population decline and difficult to attribute to it any 
component of decline should it occur. A more direct but perhaps riskier intervention would be to 
sanction flooding the market with synthetic or fake ivory and ivory substitutes.  There are many 
antique dealers who feel confident in discerning authenticity but these may not always be available 
for consultation in some bilateral trades. There also remains the open empirical question as to 
whether such market flooding would inadvertently stoke currently latent demand. 
With a modified CITES agreement in place to allow some regulated market institutions to develop 
under the scrutiny of international governmental scrutiny and international wildlife bodies (to 
ensure no illegal ivory laundering) then the speculative poaching motive from ‘one off’ or episodic 
sales maybe reduced and revenue from tusk sales fully recycled to support conservation efforts and 
fund ranger and anti-poaching patrols in countries without the economic resources to adequately 
fund them.  Eventually over time a single internationally regulated supply chain may displace and 
through scale economies price out of the market the well-established criminal syndicate supply 
chain networks. Yet learning from other criminal networks where revenue streams are challenged in 
this way (such as drug gang turf wars) suggests it is likely to be accompanied by violence, sabotage 
and bloody conflict in the short term. This would need to be resisted by well-resourced police and 
ranger services. The illegal ivory supply chain will not just quietly and conveniently disappear. 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
Elephant population numbers are seriously declining and if the rate of decline continues sub-species 
and species extinction in the coming decades are real possibilities.  This decline is fuelled by 
poaching activity to provide illegal ivory for crafted items, sculpture and jewellery. Despite the 
operation of a high profile international trade ban agreement – CITES -poaching activity has recently 
accelerated and the number of prosecutions in ivory markets such as the UK remains surprisingly 
very low indeed. The reasons for this poor prosecution rate are considered in the context of the 
regulatory complexities associated with two broad categories of illegal sub-markets.  
The British government has committed itself to tackling the illegal trade in wildlife and to date have 
implemented strategies including the Illegal Wildlife Trade (IWT) Challenge Fund and Darwin Fund 
administered by DEFRA, both of which are aimed at tackling the trade at source.  The UK 
Conservative Party have, in successive manifestos pledged to extend policy to include looking at the 
closing of home markets – this being most recently mooted in Andrea Leadsom’s September 2016 
announcement regarding the ban on the sale of modern ivory and her commitment to a consultation 
regarding the introduction of “documentary proof” for the sale of antique ivory.4 Whilst it is not 
suggested that the auction rooms and antiques shops of the U.K. are regularly selling modern 
“fresh” ivory as there is certainly no evidence for this, there are concerns that part of the antiques 
trade are selling post 1947 ivory as pre-1947 pieces.  
During the course of this study the authors met several highly specialist and knowledgeable dealers 
and auctioneers who had proven risk assessment strategies in place for the assessment of ivory 
which they followed closely (Cox, 2017). However, we also witnessed deals at small fairs and car 
boot sales where dealers showed little or no knowledge of the item they were selling. One example 
of this would be witnessing a car boot sale dealer assure a potential buyer of an ivory bangle that 
she could tell it was antique because it had been tested. When the buyer asked how it had been 
tested the dealer said she had “put a hot pin in it”. This may have indicated the material but it would 
not have given any indication as to age or legality. Whilst all the dealers we spoke to referred to the 
1947 cut-off date and to the recent cases involving members of the antiques trade,  when asked 
about the current law they also stated that they found DEFRA’s guidance to be unclear and 
unhelpful. Any future policy decisions from DEFRA ideally ought to avoid this type of confusion in the 
future.  
In terms of how the British antiques trade assesses an ivory item prior to offering it for sale every 
dealer consulted by us said that they used their “knowledge and experience” to assess ivory which 
came into their possession. We defined “knowledge and experience” as an assessment of the colour 
of the item, the quality of its carving, etc. In terms of a risk assessment strategy while it may be valid 
it is also difficult to regularise and legislate for such ‘assessments’. Dealers and auctioneers used 
                                                          
4 “Documentary proof” has as yet not been defined and details of the consultation process are still awaited 
from DEFRA. 
phrases like: “you know it when you see it”. In terms of creating a sound risk assessment strategy for 
members of the trade whilst the appraiser’s knowledge will inevitably play a part given the potential 
for gaps in an individual’s knowledge or the chance of misidentification is should not be all that is 
relied on. Some of the dealers and auctioneers we consulted also used other tools to supplement 
their professional knowledge including carrying out additional research regarding the items (for 
instance investigating its provenance). However, none of the dealers or auctioneers we consulted 
used scientific testing as a means of authenticating an item for sale. With scientific testing currently 
costing more than the value of many items being offered for sale it is not surprising that the trade 
are not using this method of assessment. The train of elephants sold in the Chiswick case went under 
the hammer at £100. The costs of testing in a commercial laboratory would have been in excess of 
£400.  If, therefore the British government are considering incorporating scientific testing into the 
“documentary proof” to be provided before ivory can be sold by the antiques trade, this will require 
serious consideration. How the trade view their risk assessment strategies going forward is 
important and it is also something that policy makers will need to consider in writing their new 
guidelines as to what will constitute “documentary proof” as to the age of an ivory item. 
One potential response to the issue may be the so-called “ivory passport” system which has been 
suggested by several parties (Chesters, 2016). It is suggested that such a passport would replace the 
current Article 10 certificate and remain (unlike an Article 10 certificate) with an item for ever. The 
item could not be sold without its accompanying passport, which would, rather like a car log book, 
would record past owners and provenance as well as details descriptions and photographs of the 
item. Interviewees suggested that this would be a more accurate and safe system than the current 
Article 10 certificate which, they suggested was open to abuse because it its lack of robust items 
categorisation and description. It is suggested that the cost of a passport would be higher than that 
of the Article 10 certificate, with figures in the hundreds of pounds however, an item would only 
need to acquire it once.  
As with scientific testing, however, while such a system may be acceptable to dealer sand 
auctioneers selling high value ivory items, it does not deal with the thousands of low value pieces 
routinely seen at fairs, car boot sales and shops routinely changing hands for tens of pounds. 
Finally, the issue of compensation for dealers and collectors of ivory in the event of a complete 
closure of the U.K.’s domestic ivory market should be considered. This “nuclear option” could see 
owners, dealers and collectors of ivory receiving the cash value of their item in the event of them 
becoming illegal to sell (Cox, 2017).  Whilst this may be an acceptable proposition to parties who 
would suffer a financial loss as a result of a total ban it is difficult to see that it is something to which 
the government would wish to commit. It does however undoubtedly leave buyers of hitherto legal 
items at a considerable financial disadvantage. However, this type of situation is not without 
precedent. Following “The Public Inquiry into the Shootings at Dunblane Primary School on 13 March 
1996” conducted by Lord Cullen (Cullen, 1996) the British Government instigated a ban on the public 
ownership of hand guns in the U.K. Following the ban, the government established a £150 million 
program to compensate handgun owners for firearms that they handed in to police stations during 
an amnesty period that ran from July 1997 through February 1998. That being said, if BADA are 
correct in their estimation of their being in excess of two million ivory items in British homes the 
compensation pot would need to be considerable larger than that established following the Cullen 
Report. 
It is argued that there is no single panacea that would address this environmental resource problem 
so that a mix of policy instruments should be considered. For newly poached ivory the need for 
international cooperation, resource transfers and measures to improve institutional quality are 
considered to be essential pre-requisites to ensure the efficacy of any specific regulatory instrument.  
Such instruments may be applied at various stages of the supply chain, some of which are likely to 
vary in terms of the speed of their potential impact in arresting the decline of elephant population 
numbers. 
For the trade in ostensibly ‘post-1947 existing crafted ivory’ web auction platforms are the key 
conduit in the UK and elsewhere for supporting this illegal trading. Continuous monitoring and 
enforcement, though resource intensive is considered the only practical means for addressing such 
wildlife crime. Internet trade bans are easily subverted and new, less visible auction trading 
platforms may easily emerge. 
Ultimately to address category 1 and category 2 illegal sub-markets, conservation efforts and 
elephant herd protection must be funded. One-off or episodic stockpile sales from seizures, natural 
mortality and active conservation management may provide occasional cash injections to support 
conservation and protection activities and salaries but not on a necessarily continuous basis. They 
may also have unintended consequences in stoking speculative poaching activity. Accordingly, 
revisiting the necessary institution building to support the development of a permanent regulated 
supply chain is urgently warranted. In this way conservation and protection related salaries and 
operations could be funded on a continuous sustainable basis. It is acknowledged, however, that the 
supply chains of criminal syndicates will not quietly be displaced such that a short term spike in 
violence, sabotage and poaching effort should be an expected response and well-resourced 
resistance needs to be set in place first. 
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